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Introduction
The presence of militias in a country is generally associated with state
failure or protracted violence.1 Certain studies have shown that militias
can have an extreme impact on human rights in particular countries.2
Governments in failing states may also make use of militias. In their
2013 analysis of the global Pro-Government Militias Database, Carey
et al. found that in 61 countries, an informal armed group had links
with the governments within their own country.3 The literature also
shows that governments have used armed groups in a wide number of
contingencies, such as state failure,4 counter-insurgencies,5 coups,6
trans-border security policies,7 genocide,8 as well as democratisation and
elections.9
This can be seen in the situation of Iraq. In 2014, the Iraqi army
nearly collapsed fighting the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), unable
to withstand their aggressive attacks. As a result, ISIS came to control
about one-third of Iraq’s territory, including the city of Mosul. The
weak performance of Iraqi security forces provided an opportunity for
the militia groups outside state-control to play their part in the fight
against ISIS. Around the same time, a fatwa issued by the Grand Ayatollah
Ali Al-Sistani, in which he called people to fight ISIS, strengthened these
armed groups. They organised themselves under the umbrella of the
Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF, in Arabic “Hashd al-Shaabi”).
There is no doubt that these armed groups had a very positive role in
defeating the ISIS in various places and cities in Iraq, to the extent that
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the Iraqi officials including prime minister praised these groups and incor-
porated them legally into the Iraqi security forces with the same structures.
Following the defeat of ISIS, the role of PMF groups needs to be
re-evaluated, particularly given their perceived contribution to sectarian
tensions and violence. Some of these groups even fought against the
Iraqi government and U.S.-led coalition forces between 2003–2011.
Since these pro-government militias are formally part of the Iraqi security
forces, it is particularly worrisome that some are openly aligned to Iran.
This allegiance makes them a proxy of neighbouring states and less com-
mitted to Iraqi national interests. Another problem with the presence of
these armed groups is their track record of human rights violations and
continued attacks on U.S. personnel, embassy, and military bases.
These pro-government militias will present a serious threat to state stab-
ility because of the support they receive from political and religious
elites, which allows them to act with impunity on behalf of these elites.
They also give priority to their private interests in dealing with security
issues, which makes state oversight and control difficult.
This article attempts to address the following questions: Who are the
pro-government militias in Iraq? Do they pose a threat to stability and
human rights? How are they influencing the state institutions? Can be
they controlled by the government?
In order to define the militias in Iraq, this study will adopt Carey et al.’s
definition of a pro-government militia (PGM): “a group that is identified
as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or subna-
tional)…”10 This definition will help to classify these security forces in
Iraq into pro-government militias, particularly the Popular Mobilisation
Forces. The members of the PMF receive pensions from the Iraqi govern-
ment, while benefitting from greater autonomy than regular Iraqi security
forces.
Historical Background of the Militias in Iraq
The origins of many of these militias in Iraq dates back to the 1980s and
1990s, when the rivalry between Iraq and Iran was particularly intense.
Shia opposition leaders and politicians left Iraq and spent years in exile
in Tehran during Saddam Hussein’s rule. Iran helped these dissenters
establish their militias and political parties. One of them was the Badr
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Organization, the most powerful armed group in Iraq, established in 1982
by Iraqis in exile with the help of the Iranians to fight Saddam Hussein.
After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tehran seized the opportunity to
benefit from its longstanding military, political, and financial connections
with the Militia groups.11
Since then, several militia groups linked to Iran emerged in Iraq, advocat-
ing for Tehran’s interests in Iraq. Article 9 of Iraq’s 2005 constitution made
clear that existing militia forces in Iraq were illegal, stating, “The for-
mation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is
prohibited.”12 The illegal status of these militias did not prevent some
from engaging in activities against the U.S-led coalition and the Iraqi gov-
ernment. Among the Shia, Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army), led by Muqtada
al Sadr, continued to operate outside the framework of the Iraqi security
forces. In 2004, Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers launched a multi-province
uprising, proclaiming “the occupation is over!” and “we are now con-
trolled by Sadr. The Americans should stay out.”13 As a result, from
2004 to 2007, Jaish al-Mahdi played a major role in deepening the sectar-
ian conflict, fighting against both the Iraqi government and the US-led
coalition in Iraq.14 During that time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) Quds Force provided Jaish al-Mahdi and other militia
groups with funding, training, and weapons.15 In 2006, Asaib Ahl al-
Haq (League of the Righteous, or AAH) was established with the
support and guidance of the IRGC Quds Force. They emerged due to
a split within the Jaish al-Mahdi, between Qais al-Khazali and Muqtada
al-Sadr, the leader of Jaish al-Mahdi. AAH became an Iranian-backed
Shi’a militant group, receiving up to $2 million a month from Iran,
according to Iraqi intelligence, and conducting several attacks against
U.S. and Iraqi forces.16 Other militias, including the Badr Organization
integrated into the federal security forces en masse. This amalgamation
process allowed the Badr organisation to increase and solidify its influence
among the security forces, federal ministries and, intelligence agencies.
By 2007, Basra was a haven for militias and their criminal activities. The
Iraqi government had no control in the city. As a result, the Iraqi govern-
ment, with U.S. support, launched major security campaigns in Basra such
as Operation Saulat al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights). Jaish al-Mahdi and
AAH were defeated in the operation and a large portion of AAH’s core
leadership was arrested by U.S. and coalition forces, including their
leader Qais al-Khazali. To avoid arrest by U.S. and Iraqi forces,
Muqtada al-Sadr fled to Iran. Following Jaish al-Mahdi’s defeat in 2008,
Sadr ordered his followers to suspend violent operations against the U.S.
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and Iraqi forces.17 During this period, the Iraqi government and the U.S.
were dealing with al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups, particu-
larly in Sunni areas. To facilitate this, U.S. forces launched a campaign
to mobilise local Sunni tribal forces to fight against al-Qaeda. This
action was called al-Sahwah al-Sunniyah (the Sunni Awakening) or
Abna al-Iraq (Sons of Iraq). By 2008, the Sons of Iraq movement included
some 30 tribes, with an estimated 80,000 members.18 This counter-insur-
gency was successful in containing al-Qaeda, and as compensation, the
movement’s leaders expected to be integrated into security forces and
gain political power in their areas. However, former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki failed to meet the movement’s demands and stopped
paying them regularly.19 Thus, the disgruntled leaders of the movement
became easy targets for the remnants of al-Qaeda and the fore-runners
of the Islamic State.
The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the withdrawal of U.S.
forces in Iraq, and the rise of ISIS in 2014, provided an opportunity for
some militia groups to regain power. The context also created the ideal
conditions for new militia groups to form. These groups include:
Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, the Imam Ali Brigades, Kataib Sayyad al
Shuhada, and Saraya al Salam.
ISIS: An Opportunity for Militias in Iraq
As stated above, in 2014 the Iraqi army came close to being defeated in its
fight against the Islamic State, and found it difficult to withstand its attacks.
Consequently, ISIS controlled about one-third of Iraq’s territory, including
the city ofMosul.Theweakperformanceof the Iraqi security forces provided
an opportunity for the militia groups outside state-control to play their part.
Until the rise of the ISIS in Iraq in 2014, all themilitias were illegal according
to the Iraqi constitution; but their status and identity changed when the
Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the leading Ayatollah in Iraq, issued a
Fatwa (mentioned above) calling on all able-bodied Iraqis to defend their
country from ISIS. Existingmilitias were very quick to seize this opportunity
to reorganise and recruit newmembers under the umbrella of the “Hashd al-
Shaabi,” or Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).20
The PMF includes almost every Shia militia in Iraq, but their allegiances are
split among three main individuals: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran, Ayatol-
lahAli al-Sistani, andMuqtada al-Sadr. Themost powerful groupswithin the
PMF are aligned to Iran, like Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada,
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KataibHezbollah, and the Badr Brigade.Many openly pledged their loyalties
to Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. The second faction in the PMF
includes several apolitical militias – for example Saraya al-Ataba al-Hussai-
niya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Alawiya, Saraya al Ataba al-Abbasiya, and Liwa’
Ali al-Akbar – that pledged their spiritual allegiance to Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani. Finally, there is Saraya al-Salam, another strong militia, that is
under Muqtada al-Sadr’s command.21 Their varying allegiances and ties to
non-Iraqi leaders affected state security. While formally under state control
they at times have separate agendas from the Baghdad leadership. According
to certain media outlets, among the 66 armed groups who constitute the
PMF, 44 of them take their orders directly from Iran. Historical relations
between Iran and thesemilitias have provided an opportunity for the Iranians
to involve themselves in the organisation and training of these groups.
Following the PMF’s establishment in 2014, the Iraqi policy toward the
militias drastically shifted. Iraqi prime minister Nuri-Al Maliki began to
work with the armed forces inside the PMF and allowed them to
operate in Iraq. This was considered an approval, even if unofficial, of
these armed groups by Maliki, despite his earlier efforts to counter their
growing influence. Furthermore, when the Iraqi army came close to col-
lapse in June 2014, Maliki issued an official decree to establish the Com-
mission for the PMF. This decision was in direct violation of Article 9 of
the Iraqi constitution which forbids the establishment of “militias outside
the framework of the Armed Forces.”22 However, it was the first effort
toward integrating the PMF into the state institution. The PMF Commis-
sion became a government body whose role it is to administer and manage
the PMF.23 In November 2016, the Iraqi Council of Representatives
passed a special law on the legal status of the PMF, defining them as “an
independent military formation as part of the Iraqi armed forces and
linked to the Commander-in-Chief” (the prime minister).24 The law
recognised the PMF as a legal government entity. In March 2018, in
order to control these armed forces, former Iraqi prime minister Haider
al-Abadi issued a decree to integrate them into Iraq’s traditional security
forces and officially place them under the discipline of Iraq’s Ministry of
Defence or Ministry of Interior. PMF leaders refused the decree and pro-
posed a counter-offer to maintain their independence from these minis-
tries. At the time of writing, the PMF is officially an independent
armed body and enjoys legal status under the National Security
Council, which reports to the Prime Minister.25
These legal provisions have helped empower the PMF, facilitating their
ability to operate with relative impunity in Iraq. Arguably, the PMF, in
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cooperation with the Iraqi Security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga forces and
the international coalition, played a large role in defeating ISIS.26 Follow-
ing the defeat of the ISIS, questions were raised about the role of the
remaining PMF in the post-ISIS Iraq, given that these armed forces had
been permitted to operate in Iraq for the sake of defeating ISIS. On
22nd October 2017, former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated
in a news conference that
Iranian militias that are in Iraq, now that the fight against Daesh and ISIS is coming
to a close, those militias need to go home. The foreign fighters in Iraq need to go
home and allow the Iraqi people to regain control.
The statement was a clear message that Iranian-linked armed forces, such
as the Badr Organization, Asaib ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah, were
no longer needed in Iraq.27
Yet, the Iraqi government ignoredTillerson’s call to disband Iranian-linked
paramilitary units. At that time, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi
announced that pro-government armed groups were Iraqi and were not
Iranian proxies. Another statement by his office emphasised that the PMF
“should be encouraged because they will be the hope of country and the
region” and they “defended their country and sacrificed themselves to
defeat the Islamic State group”.28 Nonetheless, since their establishment
in 2014, all Iraqi prime ministers, Nuri al-Maliki, Haider al-Abadi, Adil
Abdul-Mahdi and now Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, have attempted to control
the PMF, placing them under the command of the Prime Minister’s
Office.However, these efforts have failed to rein them in because the domi-
nant groups within the PMF, such as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-
Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah, have more symbolic and social power than the
prime minister.29 The Iraqi government and Iraqi leaders played a pivotal
role in empowering and institutionalising the pro-government forces, but
retained limited authority over them.
Pro-Government Militias and Human Rights Violations
The PMF’s violations of human rights began during the first year of their
operations against the ISIS. Amnesty International documented several
cases of kidnapping, abductions, and unlawful killings by Shia militias in
Baghdad, Kirkuk, Samara and other places. The report stated that
Shia militias… have been taking advantage of the atmosphere of lawlessness and
impunity to abduct and kill Sunni men, seemingly in reprisal or revenge for
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[ISIS] attacks and at times also to extort money from the families of those they have
abducted.30
In 2015, Human Rights Watch published a report in which they listed the
Badr Brigades, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Saraya Talia al- Khur-
asani, and Kataib Jund al-Imam as the worst militias in terms of brutality
and criminality. The report noted that these militia forces torched,
looted and destroyed hundreds of civilian houses and buildings in Tikrit
and the nearby areas of Al-Bu Ajil, al-Alam and al Dur across the Tigris
River, in violation of the laws of war.31 In May 2016, serious abuses
took place during the liberation of Fallujah and Saqlawiyah, resulting in
the killing of 49 Sunni men at the PMF’s detainee centre in Saqlawiyah
and the disappearance of 643 other Sunni men. Amnesty International
reported further mass disappearances of Sunni men. Kataib Hezbollah
was largely considered responsible, having an illegal detention facility in
Jurf al-Sakhar, east of Razzaza.32
Fanar Hadad argued in his 2018 study of the PMF that: “[w]hen it comes
to the question of human rights violations and the [PMF], there is little
room for debate: the [PMF] have undoubtedly and repeatedly committed
gross human rights violations”.33 Unfortunately, these human rights vio-
lations are rarely investigated properly by the Iraqi government. Accord-
ing to the 2016 legal declaration, members of these armed forces are
subject to the same military justice as all other security services. Yet, this
system is rarely applied to the PMF, and the Iraqi government omits to
carry out proper oversight of them.34 These violations are not only
limited to wartime; they occurred during the 2019 and 2020 protests.
Shooters from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Saraya Talia
al-Khurasani and Badr were involved in the mass killing of unarmed pro-
testors.35 A report by Reuters noted evidence that “the snipers were
elements of militias reporting directly to their commander instead of the
chief commander of the armed forces…They belong to a group that is
very close to the Iranians.”36 According to the Iraqi Commission for
Human Rights, at least 536 people were killed and 23,545 were
wounded others in those protests.37
In January 2021, the US Department of the Treasury placed sanctions on
the chairman of the PMF and former Iraqi National Security Advisor Falih
al-Fayadh, for his connection to serious human rights abuses and involve-
ment in suppressing the Iraqi protests that began in October 2019.38 The
Fatah Coalition, which represents the political front of the Shia militia
groups in the Iraqi parliament, said that the designation of a government
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official represented an attack on the Iraqi state itself.39 Similarly the Iraqi
foreign minister said the U.S. Treasury decision was “unacceptable”.40
At the time of writing, it is not clear what the Iraqi government intends
to do about al-Fayyadh’s designation. It is not the first time that the
U.S. Treasury department has targeted Shia militia leaders, particularly
those with close ties to Iran. Likewise, at the start of the 2019 protests,
the U.S. Treasury department gave similar treatment to Qais al-Khazali,
Laith al-Khazali, Husayn Falih Aziz al-Lami, all of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, for
their roles in serious human rights abuse in Iraq.41
Pro-Government Militias and State Security
Militia groups pose a threat “[i]f they fill a functional hole left by the state”
as this “further challenges the legitimacy of the state”. This can therefore
lead to conflict, as “militias do not support state institutions” because
“loyalties lie within the militia organisation”.42 In addition,
[a]though the militias in Iraq have links across the region, especially with Iran, they
are essentially sub-national organisations that came into existence to protect certain
groups. Yet they use violence not only for defensive or protective purposes but also
in offensive ways against rivals and sectarian enemies.43
By looking at the history of the militias in Iraq, it becomes evident that
some of the pre-existing militias such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hez-
bollah fought against the U.S. and Iraqi governments. For example, Asaib
Ahl al-Haq claimed responsibility for over 6,000 attacks against U.S. and
Iraqi forces from 2006 to 2010.44 Generally, Iranian-aligned militias are
the most powerful groups within the PMF, and in conjunction with
Iran, engage in continued efforts to thwart the U.S. presence in Iraq.
Since late 2019, tensions have been high between the U.S. and Iranian-
backed militias after a U.S. contractor was killed in a rocket attack on a
coalition base in northern Kirkuk. U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo accused Iranian-backed militias of conducting the attacks and
alerted Tehran that any strikes by Iran, or proxies, that harmed Americans
or allies would be “answered with a decisive U.S. response.”45 A few days
later, the U.S. conducted air strikes in Iraq and Syria against the Kataib
Hezbollah – an Iran-backed Iraqi militia, resulting in the death of 25 fight-
ers and wounding another 51 armed men. Kataib Hezbollah’s leader Abu
Mahdi al-Muhandis, warned that “the blood of the martyrs will not be in
vain”, and that “our response will be very tough on the American forces in
Iraq.”46 Following his statement, hundreds of members and supporters of
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pro-Iranian militias, particularly Kataib Hezbollah, gathered to chant
“death to America”, breaching the outer wall of the U.S. embassy in
Baghdad and setting it on fire. In response, U.S. president Donald
Trump angrily blamed Iran for organising the attack and said he expected
Baghdad to use its security forces to protect the American compound.47
This incident proved that Iraqi security forces were unable to stand
against the militia forces, or perhaps had no intention of stopping them
from attacking the U.S embassy.
In the early hours of 3rd January 2020, the U.S. killed top Iranian military
official General Qassim Soleimani – commander of IRGC’s Quds Force,
along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy commander of the PMF
and leader of Kataib Hezbollah, in a drone strike near the Baghdad
airport.48 Following the strike, U.S. President Donald Trump stated
that Soleimani was planning imminent attacks on American diplomats
and military forces, but that he had been killed before such attacks
could take place. He also said that Soleimani was behind recent attacks
on U.S. targets in Iraq and the violent assault on the U.S embassy in
Baghdad.49 The death of Soleimani shocked the international community,
including the Iranians. This was the first time, since 2003, that the U.S.
directly targeted a top Iranian commander on Iraq’s territory. For Iran,
the loss of Soleimani was a major setback for its foreign policy. He was
one of the most powerful and influential officials in Iran, perhaps
second only to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iranian leaders, including
Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, vowed
revenge for the killing. Three days of public mourning were declared in
Iran, and hundreds of thousands attended Soleimani’s funeral across
Iran.50 Five days after Soleimani’s death, Iran targeted two Iraqi military
bases where U.S. military forces were located. Several ballistic missiles
were fired but the attack resulted in no casualties according to U.S. and
Iraqi militaries.51 President Trump downplayed the attack by tweeting
that “All is well!” and “So far, so good!”.52
Within Iraq, popular sentiment was clear: thousands of people gathered in
Baghdad and other cities to mourn the deaths of Soleimani and Al-
Muhandis. Two days later, the Iraqi Council of Representatives voted
to remove U.S. troops from the country, although the decision did not
change the status of U.S. military forces in Iraq as it was a non-binding
resolution.53 Some Iraqi officials, including Iraqi prime minister Adil
Abdul-Mahdi, complained that the U.S. strike on Soleimani violated
Iraqi sovereignty.54 Since then, pro-Iranian militias repeatedly fired
rockets at the U.S. embassy in the Baghdad. The attacks were so frequent
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that U.S. officials considered closing the U.S. embassy if the Iraqi govern-
ment did not intervene and ensure the security of foreign diplomats.
Attacks by the pro-Iranian militias appeared to be in retaliation for the
deaths of Soleimani and Al-Muhandis, as well as an effort to expel U.S.
armed forces from the country. Thus, since 2020, Iraq has become a bat-
tleground for U.S.-Iran rivalry and their proxies in Iraq.
These armed forces have become a mechanism for instability in Iraq, vio-
lating human rights on many occasions. Remaining groups of this type
will pose substantial threats to Iraq’s future, as these militias are not
under the control of the Iraqi government nor do they take orders
solely from the state. Moreover, many of the powerful armed groups
within the PMF have proved that their loyalty lies with Iran, becoming
a proxy for Iran’s interests and strategy in Iraq.55 Tehran is also actively
working with these groups to undermine U.S. political and military inter-
ests in Iraq. Iranian-aligned militias openly demanded the full withdrawal
of U.S. troops in Iraq following the assassination of Soleimani in early
2020. Iraq’s Parliament issued a nonbinding resolution for withdrawing
U.S. forces in Iraq.56 At that time, the former Iraqi prime minister Adel
Abdul Mahdi asked U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo to arrange the
withdrawal of American forces, but the U.S. disregarded the Iraqi govern-
ment’s demand.57 This shows that these forces not only have military
leverage in Iraq, but are also engaged in the political process. It was
argued that some of the PMF such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and
Asaib Ahl al-Haq are spreading their influence into Iraqi politics and the
Iraqi economy, in addition to their influence in the military and security
sectors.58 Following the defeat of ISIS, pro-Iranian militias successfully
transferred their military gains into political victory when they formed
the “Fatah” alliance and participated in the Iraqi general elections on
12th May 2018. They won 47 seats out of the 329 seats, becoming the
second largest majority in the parliament.59 Since then, the political
wing of these armed groups has participated in the political process,
gaining greater access to state resources and weapons. If these militia
forces are not disarmed and demobilised, they will continue to threaten
human rights and stability in Iraq.
Conclusion
This article argues that pre-existing militias and new militias in Iraq were
very quick to exploit the weak performance of Iraqi security forces
against ISIS in 2014, and organise themselves under the umbrella of the
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PMF, supported by Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s Fatwa. During that time,
the Iraqi government welcomed any assistance, even from a militia like
AsaibAhl al-Haqwhich had previously fought against the Iraqi government
and the coalition forces. Integrating these forces was a violation of Iraq’s
constitution which prohibits the existence of any armed groups outside
of the state security apparatus. Some of these militias were established
based on sectarian factors and followed orders from Iran. Their role in
defeating ISIS not only made them popular amongst local populations,
but resulted in the political support of Iraqi political leaders. This allowed
them to integrate into the Iraqi security apparatus and participate in the pol-
itical process. Since their creation, these forces have violated human rights
by killing and torturing many innocent and unarmed people in predomi-
nantly Sunni areas, destroyingmany villages, homes, and buildings, accord-
ing to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. They were also
involved in killing and injury of several protesters in 2019–2020.Moreover,
the most influential groups in the PMF continue to take orders from
Tehran, having sworn their allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khame-
nei, and fight as proxies to secure Iran’s interest in Iraq. The pro-Iranian
militias’ rocket attacks against the U.S. embassy, personnel, and military
bases in 2020, further destabilised Iraq and endangered Iraqi-U.S relations.
Despite the defeat of ISIS, these pro-governmentmilitiaswill continue pose
a grave threat to the state stability and human rights because of their ability
to act with impunity, outside of state control.
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